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ABSTRACT
The recent federal education bill, No Child Left Behind, requires states to test students in grades
three to eight each year, and to judge school performance on the basis of these test scores.  While intended
to maximize student learning, there is little empirical evidence about the effectiveness of such policies.
This study examines the impact of an accountability policy implemented in the Chicago Public Schools
in 1996-97.  Using a panel of student-level, administrative data, I find that math and reading achievement
increased sharply following the introduction of the accountability policy, in comparison to both prior
achievement trends in the district and to changes experienced by other large, urban districts in the
mid-west.  I demonstrate that these gains were driven largely by increases in test-specific skills and
student effort, and did not lead to comparable gains on a state-administered, low-stakes exam.  I also find
that teachers responded strategically to the incentives along a variety of dimensions—by increasing
special education placements, preemptively retaining students and substituting away from low-stakes
subjects like science and social studies.
Brian A. Jacob






1.  Introduction 
 
In January 2002, President Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), 
ushering in a new era of educational accountability.  The new federal legislation requires states to 
test students in grades three through eight and to use these exam results to judge the performance 
of schools.  If a school fails to make adequate progress for several consecutive years, the district 
must allow children to attend another public school in the district and provide students with 
supplemental education services such as private tutoring.  Persistently low-performing schools 
may be closed or reconstituted with new staff and curriculum (Robelen 2002).   
NCLB strengthens a movement toward accountability in education that has been 
gathering momentum for nearly a decade.  Statutes in 25 states now explicitly link student 
promotion or graduation to performance on state or district assessments.  At the same time, 18 
states reward teachers and administrators on the basis of exemplary student performance and 20 
states sanction school staff on the basis of poor student performance (Quality Counts 2002).      
These accountability policies dwarf all other education reforms in scope.  Consider, for 
example, one of the most popular school reform initiatives in recent years—school choice.  Of 
the nearly 53 million children attending elementary and secondary schools in the country, only 
60,000 used vouchers to attend a private school and 580,000 others attended a charter school 
percent of all schoolchildren (Howell and Peterson 2002, CER 2002).  Of the roughly 47 million 
students in public schools, only four million participated in any type of public school choice 
program, which includes inter-district choice, magnet schools and other types of intra-district 
choice (NCES 1997).  On the other hand, the accountability program in Texas alone impacts 
approximately 3.6 million students while the policies in Chicago and New York City affect an 
additional 1.5 million students.  As the mandates of NCLB are implemented, all of the 33.4 million elementary students in the nation will be attending schools subject to test-based 
accountability.
1  
While the primary intent of such accountability policies is to provide incentives to 
maximize student learning, poorly designed incentives can have perverse consequences.  For 
example, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) show that high-powered incentives will lead agents to 
focus on the most easily observable aspects of a multi-dimensional task.  Based on similar logic, 
testing critics have argued that current accountability policies will cause teachers to shift 
resources away from low-stakes subjects, neglect infra-marginal students and ignore critical 
aspects of learning that are not explicitly tested.   
Despite its increasing popularity within education, there is little empirical evidence on 
test-based accountability (also referred to as high-stakes testing, abbreviated hereafter as HST).  
The majority of existing research focuses on mandatory high school graduation exams, which 
provide incentives for secondary students but have little direct impact on teachers or 
administrators.  Recent evidence on school-based accountability programs is mixed, with some 
studies showing modest achievement gains but other showing little change in student 
performance.  Moreover, most studies of school-based accountability do not utilize individual 
student data and thus cannot examine many outcomes of interest or investigate how effects vary 
across students.       
Test-based accountability raises three fundamental questions about the ways in which 
students and teachers respond to performance incentives.  The most fundamental question about 
HST is whether it increases student achievement.  Insofar as test-based accountability raises 
student motivation, increases parent involvement and/or improves curriculum or pedagogy, one 
                                                      
1 All national enrollment figures are taken from the 2001 Digest of Education Statistics (Digest 2001).      would expect HST to improve student performance.  Unfortunately, accountability policies are 
often implemented in conjunction with a variety of other reforms, frequently without any pre-
existing data on student performance, making it difficult to attribute the achievement changes to 
the accountability policy.      
Even if a positive causal relationship between HST and student achievement can be 
established, it is important to understand what factors are driving the improvements in 
performance.  Critics of test-based accountability often argue that its primary impact is to 
increase the time spent on test-preparation activities, thus improving test-specific skills at the 
expense of more general skills.  Others argue that test score gains reflect student motivation on 
the day of the exam.  Thus, one might want to examine whether test score gains reflect increases 
in general skills, test-specific skills, transitory student effort or some combination thereof.
2   If 
HST increased the general skill level, observed achievement gains should be reflected in other 
measures of student outcomes.  On the other hand, to the extent the improvements are due to 
transitory student effort or increases in test-specific skills, one might not expect the test results to 
generalize.   
Finally, in evaluating the effectiveness of HST, it is important to understand whether 
teachers and administrators respond strategically to the incentives provided by the accountability 
policy.  Critics have worried about educator responses along a number of dimensions.  For 
example, since low-ability students bring down the performance level of a school, the policy 
provides an incentive for teachers to find ways to exclude students from testing.  By placing low 
performing students in special education programs, teachers are able to exempt them from most 
                                                      
2 Achievement gains may also be due to increases in cheating on the part of students, teachers or administrators.  
While Jacob and Levitt (2002) found that instances of classroom cheating increased substantially following the standard testing and reporting procedures.  If special education programs are ineffective or 
inappropriate for these students, this may have detrimental long-term effects on the development 
of low-ability students.     
This paper addresses these questions in the context of a test-based accountability policy 
that was implemented in Chicago Public Schools (ChiPS) in 1996-97.
3  The ChiPS is an 
excellent case study for several reasons.  First, Chicago was the first large, urban school district 
to implement high-stakes testing.  Because the accountability policy was introduced in 1996-97, 
one can track student outcomes for up to four years.  Second, detailed student level data is 
available for all ChiPS students with unique student identification numbers that allow one to 
track individual students over time.  Earlier studies have relied on imperfect matching 
algorithms.  This unique data set allows one to not only examine a variety of different outcomes, 
but also to investigate the heterogeneity of effects across students.  Third, the Chicago policy 
resembles the policies being implemented throughout the country, incorporating incentives for 
both students and teachers.  Beginning in 1996, Chicago schools in which fewer than 15 percent 
of students met national norms in reading were placed on probation.  If student performance did 
not improve in these schools, teachers and administrators were subject to reassignment or 
dismissal.  At the same time, the ChiPS took steps to end “social promotion,” the practice of 
passing students to the next grade regardless of their academic ability.  Students in third, sixth 
and eighth grades were required to meet minimum standards in reading and mathematics in order 
to advance to the next grade.     
                                                                                                                                                                           
introduction of high-stakes testing in Chicago, they estimate that cheating increases could only explain an extremely 
small part of the test score gains since 1996-97. 
3 In this analysis, I do not focus on the programs that accompanied the introduction of the accountability policy such 
as summer school or training for teachers in low-achieving schools.  For an evaluation of these programs, see Jacob I find considerable evidence of a causal relationship between HST and student 
achievement.  Math and reading scores on the city-administered Iowa Test Basic Skills (ITBS) 
increased sharply following the introduction of the accountability policy.  These gains were 
substantially larger than would have been predicted by prior achievement trends in Chicago, and 
were substantially larger than the achievement changes experienced by other urban districts in 
Illinois and in other large mid-western cities.  Moreover, the pattern of achievement gains is 
consistent with the incentives provided by the policy, with low-achieving schools showing 
substantially larger gains than other schools.   
It appears that these achievement gains were driven primarily by increases in test-specific 
skills and student effort.   There was no comparable jump in student test scores on the state-
administered Illinois Goals Assessment Program (IGAP) following the introduction of the policy.  
Moreover, an item-level analysis of the ITBS math gains indicates that students made the greatest 
improvements on questions involving computation and number concepts—skills heavily 
emphasized on the ITBS exam—but little if any improvement on questions testing skills such as 
estimation, data interpretation and multiple-step problem-solving.  While students made roughly 
equivalent improvement in all skill areas on the reading exam, they showed the largest 
improvement on test questions at the end of the exam (conditional on item difficulty), consistent 
with an increase in student effort during the exam (i.e., what might be described as a test 
“stamina” effect).   
Finally, I show that teachers responded strategically to the incentives along a variety of 
dimensions.  Following the introduction of high-stakes testing, (i) there was a substantial 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and Lefgren (2002a, 2002b).  For an earlier analysis of the accountability policy in Chicago, see Roderick, Jacob and 
Bryk (2001). 
 increase in the proportion of students in special education and/or excluded from testing; (ii) 
retention rates increased substantially in grades not directly affected by the student promotion 
policy; and (iii) science and social studies scores increased at a significantly slower rate than 
math and reading scores. 
These findings have several interesting implications.  On the one hand, they provide 
strong empirical support for general incentive theories, including the multi-task theories of 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).  Moreover, the findings from Chicago belie the view espoused 
by many policy-makers that teachers and schools are impervious to change.  On the other hand, it 
is less clear how to evaluate high-stakes testing in Chicago as a school reform strategy.  Because 
the achievement gains are driven largely by increases in skills emphasized on the ITBS exam, an 
assessment of the policy depends largely on how one values these skills and how much one 
believes that there has been a decrease in other skills that are not assessed on standardized 
achievement exams.  One must also consider the impact of changes in special education and 
retention rates, which will depend on how one views these programs.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature on high-stakes testing and provides some background on the Chicago policy.  Section 3 
discusses the empirical strategy and Section 4 describes the data.  Sections 5 to 7 present the 
main findings and Section 8 concludes.         
 
2.  Background   
2.1. Prior Research on High-Stakes Testing 
The bulk of existing research on high-stakes testing focuses on high school graduation 
exams.  While several studies have found a positive association between student achievement and such exams (Bishop 1998, Frederisksen 1994, Neill 1998, Winfield, 1990), studies with 
better controls for prior student achievement find no achievement effects (Jacob 2001).  However 
these studies provided only limited insight into impact of school-based accountability because 
they focus exclusively on high school students and do not involve policies that hold teachers or 
administrator accountable for student performance.     
The evidence on school-based accountability programs and student performance is 
decidedly mixed.  Craig and Sheu (1992) found modest improvements in student achievement 
after the implementation of a school-based accountability policy in South Carolina in 1984, but 
Ladd (1999) found that a school-based accountability program in Dallas during the early 1990s 
had few achievement benefits. Smith and Mickelson (2000) found that a similar program in 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg did not increase the academic performance of students relative to the 
state average.  Several studies note that Texas students have made substantial achievement gains 
since the implementation of that state’s accountability program (Grissmer and Flanagan 1998, 
Grissmer et. al. 2000, Haney 2000, Klein et. al. 2000, Toenjes et. al. 2000, Deere and Strayer 
2001).   
There is somewhat more consistent evidence that educators respond strategically to test-
based accountability.  Figlio and Getzler (2002) and Cullen and Reback (2002) find that schools 
respond to accountability policies by classifying more students as special needs or LEP (limited 
English proficient), thereby removing them from the test-taking pool.  Koretz and Barron (1998) 
find survey evidence that elementary teachers in Kentucky shifted the amount of time devoted to 
math and science across grades to correspond with the subjects tested in each grade.  Deere and 
Strayer (2001) found evidence that Texas schools have substituted across outputs in the face of the TAAS system, focusing on the high-stakes subjects and low-achieving students.
4   Various 
studies suggest that test preparation associated with high-stakes testing may artificially inflate 
achievement, producing gains that are not generalizable to other exams (Linn and Graue 1990, 
Shepard 1990, Koretz et. al. 1991, Koretz and Barron 1998, Stecher and Barron 1998, Klein et. 
al. 2000).   
 
2.2 High-Stakes Testing in Chicago 
In 1996 the ChiPS introduced a comprehensive accountability policy designed to raise 
academic achievement.  The first component of the policy focused on holding students 
accountable for learning, by ending a practice commonly known as “social promotion” whereby 
students are advanced to the next grade regardless of ability or achievement level.  Under the new 
policy, students in third, sixth and eighth grades are required to meet minimum standards in 
reading and mathematics on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) in order to advance to the next 
grade.
5  Students who do not meet the standard are required to attend a six-week summer school 
program, after which they retake the exams.  Those who pass move on to the next grade.  
Students who again fail to meet the standard are required to repeat the grade, with the exception 
of 15-year-olds who attend newly created “transition” centers.  
The scope of the effort was one of the most striking features of Chicago’s social 
promotion policy.  Although many Chicago students in special education or bilingual programs 
are exempt from standardized testing, 70 to 80 percent of the students in the system were directly 
                                                      
4 Deere and Strayer (2001) focus on TAAS gains, though Grissmer and Flanagan (1998) make a similar point 
regarding NAEP gains. 
5The social promotion policy was actually introduced in Spring 1996 for eighth grade students, although it is not 
clear how far in advance students and teachers knew about this policy.  In general, the results presented here remain affected by the accountability policies.  Of those who were subject to the policy, nearly 50 
percent of third graders and roughly one-third of sixth and eighth graders failed to meet the 
promotional criteria and were required to attend summer school in 1997.  Of those who failed to 
meet the promotional criteria in May, however, approximately two-thirds passed in August.  As a 
result, roughly 20 percent of third grade students and 10 to 15 percent of sixth and eighth grade 
students were ultimately held back in the Fall.       
In conjunction with the social promotion policy, the ChiPS also instituted a policy 
designed to hold teachers and schools accountable for student achievement.  Under this policy, 
schools in which fewer than 15 percent of students scored at or above national norms on the 
ITBS reading exam were placed on probation.  If they did not exhibit sufficient improvement, 
these schools could  be reconstituted, which involved the dismissal or reassignment of teachers 
and school administrators.   In 1996-97, 71 elementary schools serving over 45,000 students were 
placed on academic probation.
6  While ChiPS has only recently closed any elementary schools, 
teachers and administrators in probation schools as early as 1997 reported being extremely 
worried about their job security and staff in other schools reported a strong desire to avoid 
probation (Tepper, Stone & Roderick, forthcoming).     
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the same whether one considers the eighth grade policy to have been implemented in 1996 or 1997.  Thus for 
simplicity, I use 1997 as the starting point for all grades. 
6 Probation schools received some additional resources and were more closely monitored by ChiPS staff.  Jacob and 
Lefgren (2002b) examined the resource effects of probation using a regression discontinuity design that compared 
the performance of students in schools that just made the probation cutoff with those that just missed the cutoff.  
They found that the additional resources and monitoring provided by probation had no impact on math or reading 
achievement. 3.  Empirical strategy 
Because Chicago instituted its accountability policy district-wide in 1996-97, it is 
difficult to identify the causal impact of the program with certainty.  Consider the following 
standard education production function:    
 
(1)   isdt dt d t s sdt isdt dt isdt u Z X HighStakes y ε φ η γ β β δ + + + + + + + = 2 1 ) (  
 
where y is an achievement score for individual i in school s in district d at time t, X is a vector of 
student characteristics, Z is a vector of school and district characteristics and ε  is a stochastic 
error term.  Unobservable factors are captured by student (u), time (γ ), district (η) and 
time*district (φ ) effects.   
There are three primary threats to identification of δ, the effect of HST.  First, one might 
be worried that the composition of students has changed substantially during the period in which 
HST was implemented, so that  0 ) , ( ≠ u HighStakes Cov .  An influx of recent immigrants during 
the mid-to-late 1990s, for example, might biasδ downward whereas the return of middle-class 
students to the ChiPS would likely biasδ upward.  Second, one might be concerned about 
changes at the state or national level that occurred at the same time as HST, so that 
0 ) , ( ≠ γ HighStakes Cov .  For example, state or federal education policies to reduce class size or 
mandate higher quality teachers that were enacted during the mid-1990s would likely lead us to 
overestimate the impact of HST.  Similarly, improvements in the economy or other time-varying 
factors coincident with the policy would bias our estimates.  Finally, one might be worried about 
other policies or programs in Chicago whose impact was felt at the same time as HST, so that 0 ) , ( ≠ φ HighStakes Cov .  This includes programs implemented at the same time as HST as well 
as programs implemented earlier whose effects become apparent at the same time as the 
accountability policy was instituted (e.g., an increase in full-day kindergarten that began during 
the early 1990s).      
The rich set of longitudinal, student-level data I use allows me to overcome some of these 
concerns.  Using detailed administrative data for each student, I am able to control for observable 
changes in student composition, including race, socio-economic status and prior achievement.   
Moreover, because achievement data is available back to 1990, six years prior to the introduction 
of HST, I am also able to account for pre-existing achievement trends within the ChiPS.  I thus 
look for a sharp increase in achievement (a break in trend) following the introduction of HST as 
evidence of a policy effect.  Using data on students before and after the policy change, I estimate 
variations of the following specification:   
(2)    ist st ist ist Z X y ε β β γ δ + + + + = 2 1 ) PriorTrend ( ) HighStakes (  
This short, interrupted time-series design (Ashenfelter 1978) accounts for changes in 
observable characteristics as well as any unobservable changes (due to shifts in student 
composition, prior reform efforts in Chicago, and state or federal initiatives) that would have 
influenced student achievement in a gradual, continuous manner.
7  This is essentially a 
difference-in-difference estimator where the first difference is a within student change over time 
and the second difference is a district-wide change from pre-policy to post-policy.  The size and 
                                                      
7 The inclusion of a linear trend implicitly assumes that any previous reforms or changes would have continued with 
the same marginal effectiveness in the future.  If this assumption is not true, the estimates may be biased.  In 
addition, this aggregate trend assumes that there are no school-level composition changes in Chicago.  I test this 
assumption by including school-specific fixed effects and school-specific trends in certain specifications and find 
comparable results. scope of the accountability policy in Chicago mitigates any concern about other district-wide 
programs that might have been implemented at the same time as HST.
8    
One drawback of this strategy is that it does not account for time-varying effects that 
would have influenced student achievement in a sharp or discontinuous manner.  One might be 
particularly concerned about unobservable changes on the state or national level effecting student 
performance (e.g., implementation of state or federal school reform legislation).   Also, if there is 
substantial heterogeneity in the responses to the policy, then the achievement changes may 
appear more gradual and be harder to differentiate from other trends in the system.  For example, 
if certain schools believed that the policy was temporary and therefore did not substantially 
change their behavior during the first year of the policy.        
I attempt to address these concerns using a panel of achievement data on other urban 
districts in Illinois (e.g., Springfield, Peoria) as well as large mid-western cities outside of Illinois 
(e.g., St. Louis, Milwaukee, Cincinnati).  I estimate variations of the following specification:    
(3)   dt dt dt dt dt Z X HighStakes y ε δ + Π + Γ + = ) (  
where  y is the average reading or math score for district d at time t, HighStakes indicates the 
presence of high-stakes testing, X is a vector of district-specific fixed effects and district-specific 
trends, and Z is a vector of time-varying district characteristics (including aggregate student 
characteristics).  This too is essentially a difference-in-difference estimator where the first 
difference is the district-level change from pre-policy to post-policy and the second difference is 
a comparison of changes across districts.     
 
                                                      
8 While there were smaller programs introduced in Chicago after 1996, these were generally part (or a direct result) 
of the accountability policy.  I simply assume that the effects of these policies are part of the HST impact.     4. Data 
This study utilizes detailed administrative data from the ChiPS.  Student records include 
information on a student’s school, home address, demographic and family background 
characteristics, special education and bilingual placement, free lunch status, standardized test 
scores, grade retention and summer school attendance.  More importantly, student identification 
numbers allow one to follow students across years as long as they remain in the ChiPS, so that I 
do not have to rely on imperfect matching strategies.
9  ChiPS personnel and budget files provide 
information on the financial resources and teacher characteristics in each school and school files 
provide aggregate information on the school population, including daily attendance rates, student 
mobility rates and racial and SES composition.   
The measure of achievement used in Chicago is the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS), a 
standardized, multiple-choice exam developed and published by the Riverside Company.  
Student scores are reported in grade equivalents that reflect the years and months of learning a 
student has mastered.  The exam is nationally normed so that a student at the 50
th percentile in 
the nation scores at the eighth month of her current grade (e.g., an average third grader will score 
a 3.8).  In order to compare achievement gains across grade level and to provide a way to 
interpret the magnitude of Chicago gains, I standardize all achievement scores separately by 
grade using the 1993 student-level mean and standard deviation.    




grade from 1993 to 2000. For most analyses, I limit the sample to first-time students (e.g., 
students in the third, sixth or eighth grade for the first time in their school career) because the 
implementation of the social promotion policy caused a large number of low-performing students in third, sixth and eighth grade to be retained, which substantially changed the student 
composition in these and subsequent grades beginning in 1997-98.
10  In order to have sufficient 
prior achievement data for all students, I limit the analysis to cohorts beginning in 1993.   
I delete less than 2 percent of the students from the sample because they were missing 
demographic information.  In addition, each year roughly 10 percent of students were not tested  
(most often because of a special education or bilingual placement) and are therefore not included 
in the achievement estimates, although they are included in the estimates of other outcomes.
11  
To avoid dropping students with missing prior achievement data, I impute prior achievement 
using other observable student characteristics and create a variable indicating that the 
achievement data for that student was imputed.      
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample.  Like many urban school districts 
across the country, Chicago has a large population of minority and low-income students.  In the 
sample of third, sixth and eighth graders from 1993 to 1996, for example, roughly 55 percent of 
students are Black, 30 percent are Hispanic and nearly 80 percent receive free or reduced price 
lunch.  During this period, roughly 12 percent of all students were in special education programs 
and 13 percent were either not tested or had scores that were not included for official reporting 
purposes (generally because of a bilingual or special education placement).  Among students who 
were tested, Chicago students scored roughly three-quarters of a year below national norms in 
math and nearly one year below national norms in reading.  Looking across columns, we see that 
                                                                                                                                                                           
9 There is no significant change in the percent of students leaving the ChiPS (to move to other districts, to transfer to 
private schools, or to drop out of school) following the introduction of the accountability policy.  
10 While focusing on first-timers allows a consistent comparison across time, it is still possible that the composition 
changes generated by the social promotion policy could have affected the performance of students in later cohorts.  
For example, if first-timers in the 1998 and 1999 cohorts were in classes with a large number of low-achieving 
students who had been retained in the previous year, they might perform lower than otherwise expected.  This would 
bias the estimates downward.   there were some changes in the student composition during the 1990s.   There were slight 
increases in the percentage of Hispanic students in the ChiPS and increases in the percent of 
students living in foster care, participating in bilingual programs and receiving free or reduced 
price lunch.  On the other hand, there was some increase in initial student achievement—e.g., 
prior reading achievement increased from an average of 0.89 grade equivalents below norms to 
0.71 grade equivalents below norms.  Perhaps more importantly, there were dramatic increases in 
math and reading achievement under high-stakes testing, with students gaining roughly 0.50 
GE’s in math and 0.40 GE’s in reading.  However, special education rates also increased, from 
0.116 to 0.139.      
 
5. Did high-stakes testing increase student achievement in Chicago?  
 
5.1 Math and Reading Trends on the ITBS 
Figure 1 shows unadjusted math and reading achievement trends in Chicago from 1990 to 
2000, combining the data from grades three, six and eight and standardizing student test scores 
using the 1990 student-level mean and standard deviation.  Following a slight decline in the early 
1990s, test scores increased in 1993 and remained relatively constant until 1995 or 1996, after 
which they began to increase.  The jump in 1993 is likely due to a new form of the ITBS 
introduced that year.  The ChiPS administered several different forms of the ITBS throughout the 
1990s, rotating the forms so that identical forms were never administered in two consecutive 
                                                                                                                                                                           
11 Among those students who are included in the achievement analysis less than two percent are deleted for missing 
demographic data. years.  In fact, this is the primary reason for some of the year-to-year choppiness in the trends.
12   
Some teachers report that the form of the reading exam administered in 1997—the first year of 
the accountability policy—was more difficult than earlier exams, which may explain why 
observed reading scores did not increase substantially in 1997.  (To obtain a cleaner picture of 
changes in student performance, one can compare cohorts taking identical forms – 1994, 1996 
and 1998 or 1993, 1995 and 2000.  As I show later, the general findings of the analysis remain 
the same if one focuses on achievement changes across identical test forms.) 
The raw test score trends suggest that achievement began to increase somewhat prior to 
the introduction of the accountability policy.  One explanation for this is that educators may have 
made changes in anticipation of the new policy.  When the new superintendent assumed 
responsibility of the ChiPS in 1996, he made it clear that his administration would focus on 
improving achievement and would be holding schools accountable for student performance on 
standardized tests. While this finding is consistent with an anticipation effect, it is also possible 
that the early improvements in student achievement resulted from changes in student 
composition or earlier reform efforts. 
To control for changes in student composition and prior achievement levels, Figure 2 
plots the predicted versus observed achievement scores for successive cohorts of Chicago 
students from 1993 to 2000.
13  The predicted values are derived from an OLS regression model 
that includes cohorts 1993 to 1996 and controls for student, school and neighborhood 
demographics as well as prior academic achievement and a linear time trend.  The trends in 
                                                      
12 Different forms of the exam are supposedly equated, but teachers and administrators acknowledge that forms still 
vary slightly in difficulty. 
13 Test scores are standardized separately by grade using the 1993 mean and student standard deviation.  The earliest 
years are excluded from the series because it is not possible to obtain prior achievement measures for students in 
these cohorts.   Figure 2 suggest that neither observable changes in student composition nor pre-existing trends 
in Chicago can explain the substantial improvement in student performance since 1997.  In math, 
we see that observed achievement seemed to decrease somewhat from 1993 to 1996, but then 
increased sharply after 1996.  In contrast, predicted achievement decreases slightly or remains 
flat over this period.  By 2000, observed math scores are roughly 0.30 standard deviations higher 
than predicted.  A similar pattern is apparent in reading.  Predicted and observed test scores are 
relatively flat from 1993 to 1996.  In 1997, the gap between observed and predicted scores 
appears to widen somewhat and grows substantially in 1998.  By 2000, students are scoring 
roughly 0.20 standard deviations higher than predicted.     
Even if there were no appreciable change in student composition in Chicago, it could be 
that the achievement gains in Chicago reflect more general improvements in student performance 
in the state or nation.  The economy was improving throughout the later half of the 1990s, and 
there was a considerable emphasis on public education at the federal level.  Student achievement 
nationwide, as measured by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), increased 
roughly 0.25 standard deviations in math during the 1990s, although there was no gain in 
reading.
14   
To control for unobserved, time-varying factors at the state and/or national level, Figure 3 
shows the Chicago trends relative to other urban school districts in Illinois and to other large, 
mid-western cities including Cincinnati, Gary, Indianapolis, Milwaukee and St. Louis, none of 
which implemented a comparable accountability policy during this period.  The district-level 
averages are standardized using the student-level mean and standard deviation from the earliest 
possible year for each grade*subject*district (most often 1993).  The Chicago and comparison group trends track each other remarkably well from 1993 to 1996, and then begin to diverge in 
1997.  Math and reading achievement in the comparison districts fluctuates somewhat, but 
remains relatively constant from 1996 to 2000.  In contrast, the achievement levels in Chicago 
rise sharply over this period.   
Together, these figures suggest that the accountability policy in Chicago led to a 
substantial increase in math and reading achievement.  To provide a more precise estimate of the 
effects, Table 2 shows the OLS regression results that correspond to Figures 2.  Control variables 
include race, gender, race*gender interactions, guardian, bilingual status, special education 
placement, prior math and reading achievement, school demographics (including enrollment, 
racial composition, percent free lunch, percent with limited English proficiency and mobility 
rate) and demographic characteristics of the student’s home census tract (including median 
household income, crime rate, percent of residents who own their own homes, percent of female-
headed household, mean education level, unemployment rate, percent below poverty, percent 
managers or professionals and percent who are living in the same house for five years).  Prior 
achievement is measured by math and reading scores three years prior to the base year (i.e., at t-
3).  This is done to ensure that the prior achievement measures are not endogenous.  Because the 
1999 cohort of sixth graders experienced high-stakes testing beginning in 1997, for example, one 
would not want to include their fourth or fifth grade scores in the estimation.
15  I include second 
and third order polynomials in prior achievement in order to account for any non-linear 
relationship between past and current test scores. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
14 Author’s calculation based on data available from the National Center of Education Statistics (www.nces.ed.gov). 
15 For the 2000 cohort, test scores at t-3 are endogenous as well.  As a practical matter, however, it does not appear 
to make any difference whether one uses prior achievement at t-3 or t-4, so I have used t-3 in order to include as 
many cohorts as possible. The estimates in Table 2 reveal several interesting findings.  First, the policy effect 
appears to increase from 1997 to 2000.  This is consistent with the fact that the later cohorts 
experienced more of the “treatment” and with the possibility that students and teachers may have 
become more efficient at responding to the policy over time.  It is not possible to distinguish 
between these hypotheses because the policy was implemented district-wide in 1996-97.  Second, 
it appears that the effects are somewhat larger for math than reading.  This is consistent with a 
number of education evaluations that show larger effects in math than reading, presumably 
because reading achievement is determined by a host of family and other non-school factors 
while math achievement is determined largely by school.  Third, it appears that the effects are 
somewhat larger for 8
th grade students.  This is consistent with the fact that eighth graders faced 
the largest incentives (they cannot move to high school with their peers if they fail to meet the 
promotional standards) and that they may be most able to influence their own learning.
16  Table 3 
shows the estimates reflecting the comparison between Chicago and the comparison districts.  
These results suggest that the accountability policy in Chicago increased student math 
achievement by roughly 0.35 standard deviations and reading achievement by 0.25 standard 
deviations.
 17    
 
                                                      
16 This result must be interpreted with caution since some observers have questioned whether the grade equivalent 
metric can be compared across grades (Petersen et. al. 1989; Hoover 1984).  Roderick et. al. (2001) attempt to 
correct for this and find similar results. 
17 One additional factor is important to note in interpreting these results.  The estimates for the latter cohorts may be 
biased because of compositional changes resulting from grade retention.  For example, the 1999 and 2000 eighth 
grade cohorts will not include any students who were retained as sixth graders in 1997 or 1998.  To the extent that 
retention is correlated with unobservable student characteristics that directly affect achievement, this will bias the 
estimates.  However, Jacob and Lefgren (2002a) found little difference between OLS and IV estimates of summer 
school and grade retention, suggesting that there may not be much significant correlation (conditional on prior 
achievement and other observable characteristics).  However, even if they were not retained, a proportion of the 
students in these cohorts will have attended summer school as sixth graders, which Jacob and Lefgren (2002a) show 
to increase subsequent achievement.  Therefore, it is best to interpret these coefficients for the later cohorts as upper 
bounds on the incentive effect of the policy. 5.2 The Heterogeneity of Effects Across Student and School Risk Level 
  If the improvements in student achievement were caused by the accountability policy, one 
might expect them to vary across students and schools.  In particular, one might expect marginal 
students and schools to show the largest achievement gains since the policy will be binding for 
them and they will likely feel that they have a reasonable chance of meeting the standard.  Three 
margins are relevant: (1) the social promotion margin—in order to be promoted, students were 
required to achieve at roughly the 20
th percentile (on the national ability distribution) in reading 
and math; (2) the student margin for probation—a school’s probation status is determined by the 
percent of students that score above the 50
th percentile nationally in reading; and (3) the school 
probation margin—in order to avoid probation, 15 percent of students in the school must meet 
national norms in reading.     
In order for teachers and administrators to translate these incentives into differential 
achievement effects, several conditions must hold.  First, production must be divisible.  That is, 
schools must be able to focus attention on certain students and not others, perhaps by providing 
individualized instruction.  If schools rely on class- or school-wide initiatives such as curriculum 
changes, test preparation or student motivation, then they may not be able to effectively target 
specific students.  Second, the main effect of teacher or student effort must be large relative to 
that of initial ability or the interaction between effort and initial ability.   If teacher effort has a 
substantially larger effect on high ability students than low ability students, then HST may result 
in larger gains for higher ability students despite the structure of the incentives.  Finally, schools 
must be able to clearly distinguish between high and low ability students.  While this may seem 
trivial given the prevalence of achievement testing in schools, sampling variation and measurement error in achievement exams may expand the group of students viewed as 
“marginal” by teachers and students.      
To examine the changes in achievement across student abilities, Table 4 shows OLS 
estimates of the differential effects across students and schools.  Prior student achievement is 
based on the average math and reading score three years prior to the baseline test year (i.e., 5
th 
grade scores for the 8
th grade cohorts).
18  Prior school achievement is based on the percent of 
students in the school in 1995 that met national norms on the reading exam.
19  The sample 
includes first-time students whose scores were included for reporting purposes.  The latest 
cohorts are excluded from the sample because these students will have experienced previous 
retentions, which may bias the results.  The regressions also include the full set of control 
variables used in Table 2.         
 Model 1 provides the average effect for all students in all of the post-policy cohorts, 
providing a baseline from which to compare the other results.  Model 2 shows how the effects 
vary across student and school risk level.  Note that the omitted category includes the highest 
ability students (those who scored above the 50
th percentile in prior years) in the highest 
achieving schools (schools where at least 40% of students were meeting national norms in prior 
years).  Looking across all grades and subjects, several broad patterns become apparent.  First, 
students in low-performing schools seem to have fared considerably better under the policy than 
comparable peers in higher-performing schools.  In sixth grade math, for example, students in the 
schools where fewer than 20 percent of students had been meeting national norms in previous 
years gained 0.159 standard deviations more than comparable peers in schools where over 40 
                                                      
18 Second grade test scores are used to determine prior achievement for third graders since this is the first year that 
the majority of students take the standardized achievement exams. 
19 The results are robust to classifying school risk on the basis of achievement in other pre-policy years. percent of students had been meeting national norms.   This makes sense since the accountability 
policy imposed much greater incentives on low-performing schools that were at a real risk of 
probation.   
Second, students who had been scoring at the 10
th-50
th percentile in the past fared better 
than their classmates who had either scored below the 10
th percentile, or above the 50
th 
percentile.  This is consistent with the incentives imposed on at-risk students by the policy to end 
social promotion.  Moreover, the effect for marginal students appears somewhat stronger in 
reading than math, suggesting that there may be more intentional targeting of individual students 
in reading than in math, or that there is greater divisibility in the production of reading 
achievement.  However, it is also important to note that the differential effects of student prior 
ability are considerably smaller than the differential effects of prior school achievement. This 
suggests that responses to the accountability policy took place at the school level, rather than the 
individual student level.
20     
 
5.3 Student-Focused versus School-Focused Accountability  
Unlike most previous accountability systems, high-stakes testing in Chicago provided 
direct incentives for students as well as teachers.  Students in third, sixth and eighth grade were 
required to pass reading and math exams to move to the next grade, while schools were judged 
on the basis of the reading performance of students in grades three to eight.   By examining 
differential gains across subject and grade, one might theoretically separate the effect of the 
student and school-based accountability policy.   However, in practice there are several 
                                                      
20 This result may also be due to measurement error, although this seems somewhat less likely because the student 
prior achievement measure is an average of two exam scores—math and reading—and similar results were obtained 
using a measure composed of several earlier years of test data. difficulties in this type of comparison.   First, because the lowest-achieving third and sixth 
graders were retained beginning in 1997, the subsequent cohorts in grades four, five and seven 
will be composed of substantially higher-achieving students.  Second, many of the 1998 fourth 
and seventh graders attended summer school the previous year exposing them to two additional 
months of instruction.   
Given these concerns, the 1997 cohort will provide the most easily interpretable 
comparison between gate and non-gate grades.  Table 5 presents the policy affects for grades 
three, six and eight (i.e., promotional gate grades) versus grades four, five and seven (i.e., non-
gate grades).  In 1997, there appears to be little difference in achievement effects between 
students in the promotional gate grades and those not subject to the promotional gate in 1997.
21  
One explanation for this finding is that the school probation policy was driving the overall 
achievement results.  An alternative explanation is that students in grades four, five and seven 
incorrectly believed that they were subject to the promotional requirements.  Student interviews 
provide some evidence for such confusion, possibly because teachers in these grades used 
accountability as a classroom management tool, emphasizing the promotional criteria to motivate 
students.
22  A third explanation rests on indivisibilities in production within elementary schools.  
For example, restructuring the school day to allow more time for math and reading may 
necessarily involve all grades in the school.  Finally, it is possible that the first year effects were 
somewhat anomalous, perhaps because students and teachers were still adjusting to the policy or 
because the form change that year may have affected grades differentially.  Because it was not 
affected by composition changes, grade five provides a reasonable comparison for the gate grades 
                                                      
21 The results are similar across the ability distribution.  Tables available from the author upon request. 
22 For more information on qualitative studies of the accountability policy in Chicago, see Engel and Roderick 
(2001). in 1998.  The 1998 accountability effects are at least twice as large in grades three, six and eight 
compared with grade five (for example, 0.144 versus 0.067 s.d. gain in math), suggesting that the 
student accountability provisions may have played a large role in the overall policy in later years.    
 
6.  What factors are driving the improvements in performance in Chicago?   
Even if a positive causal relationship between HST and student achievement can be 
established, it is important to understand what factors are driving the improvements in 
performance.  Critics of test-based accountability often argue that the primary impact of HST is 
to increase the time spent on test-specific preparation activities, which could improve test-
specific skills at the expense of more general skills.  Others argue that test score gains reflect 
student motivation on the day of the exam.  Unfortunately, because such things as effort and test 
preparation are not directly observable, it is difficult to disentangle the factors underlying the 
achievement gains in Chicago.  This section attempts to shed some light on the factors driving 
the achievement gains in Chicago, first by comparing student performance across exams and then 
by examining the ITBS improvements in greater detail.  
 
6.1 The Role of General Skills   
Even the most comprehensive achievement exam can only cover a fraction of the possible 
skills and topics within a particular domain.  Because all standardized tests differ to some extent 
in format and content, one would not expect gains on one test to be completely reflected in 
performance changes on another exam.  Differences in student effort across exams (or rather 
changes in student effort) also complicate the comparison of performance trends from one test to 
another.  Nonetheless, it is instructive to compare achievement changes on the high-stakes exam to changes on alternate tests since this will provide information on the extent to which 
improvements in general versus test-specific skills were driving the observed test score gains.   
Under the Chicago accountability policy, student promotion and school probation are 
based entirely on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS), an exam that has been administered by the 
district for many years.  Chicago students also take a state-administered achievement exam 
known as the Illinois Goals Assessment Program (IGAP).  While the two exams have a similar 
format (they are both timed, multiple-choice exams), the IGAP reportedly places somewhat 
greater emphasis on critical thinking and problem-solving skills.
23   
If the accountability policy operated by increasing general skills, or a broad enough range 
of specific skills, the observed ITBS gains in Chicago should be reflected to some extent in the 
IGAP trends.  Figure 4 shows IGAP achievement trends in Chicago relative to other urban 
districts in Illinois.
24  The data for this analysis is drawn from school “report cards” compiled by 
the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) which provide average IGAP scores by grade and 
subject as well as background information on schools and districts.
 25  The analysis is limited to 
the period from 1993 to 1998 because Illinois introduced a new exam in 1999.  The Chicago 
sample excludes students retained under the new promotional policy in order to provide a valid 
                                                      
23 The IGAP math exam has fewer straight computation questions, and even these questions are asked in the context 
of a sentence or word problem.  Similarly, with long passages, multiple correct answers and questions asking 
students to compare passages, the IGAP reading exam appears to be more difficult and more heavily weighted 
toward critical thinking skills than the ITBS exam.   
24 To identify the comparison districts, I first identify districts in the top decile in terms of the percent of students 
receiving free or reduced price lunch, percent minority students, and total enrollment and in the bottom decile in 
terms of average student achievement (averaged over third, sixth and eighth grade reading and math scores) based on 
1990 data.  Not surprisingly, Chicago falls in the bottom of all four categories.  Of the 840 elementary districts in 
1990, Chicago ranks first in terms of enrollment, 12
th in terms of percent of low-income and minority students and 
830
th in student achievement.  Other districts that appear at the bottom of all categories include East St. Louis, 
Chicago Heights, East Chicago Heights, Calumet, Joliet, Peoria and Arora.  I then use the 34 districts (excluding 
Chicago) that fall into the bottom decile in at least three out of four of the categories.  I have experimented with 
several different inclusion criteria and the results are not sensitive to the choice of the urban comparison group. comparison with other districts.  The achievement measure is standardized using the school level 
mean and standard deviation in Illinois in 1993. 
In 1993, Chicago students scored between 0.40 and 0.80 standard deviations below 
students in other urban districts, but appear to have narrowed the achievement gap during the 
mid-1990s.
26  However, at least in grades three and six, this trend appears to have begun prior to 
the introduction of high-stakes testing in these grades and there was no noticeable break in trend 
in 1997.   Achievement scores in grade eight, particularly in reading, show some break beginning 
in 1996.
27  Table 6 shows corresponding OLS estimates that control for a variety of time-varying 
school and district characteristics including racial composition, percent of students receiving free 
or reduced price lunch, the percent of Limited English Proficient (LEP) students, school mobility 
rates, per-pupil expenditures in the district and the percent of teachers with at least a Masters 
degree in the district.  The coefficient estimates shown in the table reflect the interaction between 
high-stakes testing years (1997 and 1998) and an indicator variable for Chicago.  The point 
estimates indicate that once we take into account district-specific pre-existing trends and 
demographics, HST appears to have a slight negative effect on IGAP achievement in Chicago.  
Rows 4 and 5 that show estimates based on the Chicago schools alone tell a similar story. 
As on the ITBS, low-achieving schools made larger gains on the IGAP than high-
achieving schools.  Table 7 shows estimates for grades three, six and eight by school 
                                                                                                                                                                           
25 The Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) does not provide item-level achievement results for the IGAP so it is 
not possible to conduct a detailed analysis of IGAP improvement, or to directly compare ITBS and IGAP gains for 
similar questions. 
26 One explanation for this is that the IGAP was viewed as the high-stakes exam prior to 1995.  The state publishes 
IGAP results annually and each year local newspapers run lengthy articles comparing results across schools and 
districts.  After 1993, the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) began reporting student level IGAP scores to 
schools and parents for the first time, and in 1995 the ISBE began using IGAP results to place low-achieving schools 
on a state watch list.  During this period, the ChiPS placed little if any emphasis on the ITBS.  
27 This is one case where it does appear important to recognize that the accountability policy started for eighth 
graders in 1996. achievement level.  In the first row, the sample includes only Chicago schools, which are divided 
into the same three categories used earlier (i.e., bottom schools are those in which 0-20% of 
students were meeting national reading norms on the ITBS in 1995, middle schools had 21-40% 
students meeting national norms, and top schools had more than 40% meeting norms).  In the 
lowest-achieving schools, the IGAP scores showed no statistically significant change following 
the introduction of HST.  In contrast, IGAP scores in the top schools dropped roughly 0.14 and 
0.13 standard deviations in reading and math.  The second row presents estimates using the urban 
comparison districts).  Here the schools are grouped into three equal size groups on the basis of 
their aggregate IGAP scores in the early 1990s.  While few of these estimates are statistically 
significant, the point estimates suggest a similar pattern, with lower-achieving schools doing 
relatively better on the IGAP under high-stakes testing.   
 
6.2 The Role of Specific Skills   
If the ITBS gains were not driven primarily by an increase in general skills, it is possible 
that they were the result of improvements in ITBS-specific skills.  Based on analysis of teacher 
survey data, Tepper (2002) concluded that ITBS-specific test preparation and curriculum 
alignment increased following the introduction of the accountability policy.  One way to examine 
the importance of these factors is to compare improvement across test items.  To the extent that 
the disproportionately large ITBS gains were driven by ITBS-specific curriculum alignment or 
test preparation, we might expect to see the largest gains on ITBS items that are (a) easy to teach 
and/or (b) relatively more common on the ITBS than the IGAP.  In math, these include questions 
that test computation and basic number concepts (e.g., arithmetic with negative and positive 
numbers, ordering numbers in sequence, using place value and scientific notation, etc.).   Table 8 presents OLS estimates of the relationship between high-stakes testing and ITBS 
math achievement by item type.  The sample includes grades three, six and eight.  By focusing on 
only those cohorts that took Form L, this analysis allows one to compare student performance on 
identical questions over time.  The dependent variable is the proportion of students who 
answered the item correctly in the particular year.  Note that these specifications also include 
controls for item difficulty to account for the correlation between item type, position and 
difficulty (e.g., the fact that the more difficult items are often included at the end of the exam and 
that certain types of questions are inherently more difficult for students).
28   
Column 1 classifies questions into two groups—those testing basic skills such as math 
computation and number concepts and those testing more complex skills such as estimation, data 
interpretation and problem-solving (i.e., word problems).  Students in 1998 were 1.7 percentage 
points more likely to correctly answer questions involving complex skills in comparison to 
cohorts in 1994 and 1996.  The comparable improvement for questions testing basic skills was 
3.9 percentage points, suggesting that under accountability students improved more than twice as 
much in basic skills as compared with more complex skills.   Column 2 separates items into five 
categories—computation, number concept, data interpretation, estimation and problem-solving—
and shows the same pattern.  In column 3, the items are classified into very detailed categories, 
providing even more information on the relative gains within the math exam.  Student 
performance on items involving whole number computation (the omitted category) increased 3.5 
percentage points.  Interestingly, students improved even more, nearly 5.7 percentage points, on 
items involving computation with fractions.  Questions testing knowledge of probability and 
                                                      
28 The item difficulty measures are the percentage of students correctly answering the item in a nationally 
representative ample used by the test publisher to norm the exam.  Interactions between item difficulty and the statistics also appear to have made relatively large gains.  In contrast, students appear to have 
made no improvement on questions involving estimating compensation (problems involving 
currency) and the effective use of various strategies to solve word-problems, and very little (if 
any) improvement on items involving multiple-step word problems, measurement and 
interpreting relationships shown in charts, graphs or tables.   
Table 8 presents similar estimates for reading.  The first column includes no indictor for 
item type while columns 2 and 3 include increasing more detailed item-type classifications.  
Unlike math, it appears that the improvements in reading performance were distributed equally 
across question type.  This analysis suggests that test preparation may have played a large role in 
the math gains, but was perhaps less important in reading improvement.  One reason may be that 
it is relatively easier to teach specific math skills whereas reading instruction in the elementary 
grades may focus largely on phonics, practice reading or other activities that are not specifically 
geared to particular test items.  Another explanation is that reading skills are more likely than 
math skills to be learned out of school.         
   
6.3 The Role of Effort 
Student effort is another likely candidate for explaining the large ITBS gains.  Interview 
and survey data provide evidence that students, particularly students in the sixth and eighth 
grades, were acutely aware of and worried about the accountability mandates (Tepper 2002; 
Roderick and Engel 2001; Tepper, Stone and Roderick, Forthcoming).  If the consequences 
associated with ITBS performance led students to concentrate more during the exam or caused 
                                                                                                                                                                           
accountability regime (1998 cohort) are included as well.  The coefficients on the item difficulty*high-stakes 
interactions are generally insignificant. teachers to ensure optimal testing conditions for the exam, test scores may have increased 
regardless of changes in general or test-specific skills.
29   
Test completion is one indicator of effort.  Prior to the introduction of high-stakes testing, 
roughly 20 percent of students left items blank on the ITBS reading exam and nearly 38 percent 
left items blank on the math exam, despite the fact that there was no penalty for guessing.
30   If 
we believe that ITBS gains were due largely to guessing, we might expect the percent of 
questions answered to increase, but the percent of questions answered correctly (as a percent of 
all answered questions) to remain constant or perhaps even decline.  However, from 1994 to 
1998, the percent of questions answered increased by 1 to 1.5 percentage points while the percent 
correct as a fraction of the percent answered increased by 4 to 5 percentage points, suggesting 
that the higher completion rates were not due entirely to guessing.  This pattern is true even 
among the lowest achieving students who left the greatest number of items blank prior to the 
accountability policy.  Even if we were to assume that the increase in item completion is due 
entirely to random guessing, however, guessing could only explain 10 to 15 percent of the 
observed ITBS gains (Jacob 2002).   
While increased guessing cannot explain a significant portion of the ITBS gains, other 
forms of effort may play a larger role.  Insofar as there is a tendency for children to “give up” 
toward the end of the exam—either leaving items blank or filling in answers randomly—an 
increase in effort may lead to a disproportionate increase in performance on items at the end of 
the exam.  One might describe this type of effort as test stamina—the ability to continue working 
and concentrating throughout the entire exam.  In order to identify test stamina effects, the 
                                                      
29 This might also be considered an effect of better testing conditions.  Figlio and Winicki (2002) present evidence 
that schools attempt to enhance testing conditions by altering the content of meals served to students during testing. 
30 The math exam consists of three subsections and is thus roughly three times as long as the reading exam. estimates in Tables 8 and 9 include variables indicating the item position—specifically, dummy 
variables denoting into which quintile of the exam the item falls (recall these estimates are 
conditional on item difficulty).  In math, we see no relationship between item position and 
improvement under accountability.  This is most likely because the math exam is divided into 
several sections so that each section is relatively short.  In reading, on the other hand, this 
relationship is striking.  Under the accountability policy, student performance on items at the end 
of the exam increased significantly more than performance on items at the beginning of the 
exam.  In column 1, for example, we see that students in 1998 were 3.6 percentage points more 
likely to answer the first 20 percent of items on the exam, as compared with students in 1994 and 
1996.  Comparing the gain across item position groups, we see that 1998 students improved 
nearly 6.7 percentage points on the final 20 percent of items.  Thus, student performance on the 
last 20 percent of items increased nearly twice as much as on the first 20 percent of items under 
the accountability policy.   This effect remains the same as one includes increasingly detailed 
item type information in columns 2 and 3.  This suggests that effort may have played a 
significant role in the ITBS gains seen under high-stakes testing.  
 
6.4. Summary 
The improvement in math achievement in Chicago appears to be driven largely by gains 
in specific skill areas such as math computation that make up a large portion of the ITBS, but are 
emphasized less on the IGAP.  This suggests that teachers aligned their math curriculum to more 
closely match the content of the high-stake exam.  In reading, ITBS gains were equally 
distributed across item types, but were considerably larger among questions at the end of the 
exam.  This suggests that student effort or “stamina” played a larger role than test preparation in the observed reading improvements.  The fact that IGAP trends did not jump sharply following 
the introduction of the accountability policy confirms that the ITBS gains were not driven 
entirely by improvements in general skills.  However, it is important to recognize that IGAP 
scores continued to increase in an absolute sense, which may mean that there was no substantial 
tradeoff in terms of skills. 
 
7.  Did educators respond strategically to high-stakes testing?   
In evaluating the effectiveness of HST, it is important to understand whether teachers and 
administrators respond strategically to the incentives provided by the accountability policy.  
Critics of test-based accountability worry about educator responses along a number of 
dimensions, ranging from changes in the rate of special education placements to substitution 
away from low-stakes subjects.  This section examines several of these issues. 
 
7.1   Low-stakes versus high-stakes subjects 
Given the consequences attached to test performance in certain subjects, one might expect 
teachers and students to shift resources and attention toward subjects included in the 
accountability program.  We can test this theory by comparing trends in math and reading 
achievement after the introduction of HST with test score trends in social studies and science, 
subjects that are not included in the Chicago accountability policy.   Unfortunately science and 
social studies exams are not given in every grade, and the grades in which these exams are given has changed over time.  For this reason, we limit the analysis to grades four and eight, from 1995 
to 1998.
31     
Table 10 shows the impact of the accountability policy on a variety of subjects.  
Achievement gains in math and reading were roughly two to four times larger than gains in 
science and social studies, although science and social studies scores also increased under HST.  
The distribution of effects is also somewhat different for low versus high-stakes subjects.  As we 
noted earlier, in math and reading, students in low-achieving schools experienced greater gains.  , 
However, conditional on school achievement, low-ability students appeared to make only slightly 
larger gains than their peers.  In science and social studies, on the other hand, low ability students 
showed significantly lower gains than their higher-achieving peers, while school achievement 
had little if any effect on science and social studies performance. This suggests that schools were 
shifting resources across subjects, particularly for low-achieving students, which is consistent 
with findings by Koretz and Barron (1998) and Deere and Strayer (2001).   
 
7.2   Special education placements 
While the accountability policies in Chicago are designed to increase student 
achievement, they also create incentives for teachers and administrators to alter the pool of test-
takers.
32  Each year, a certain number of students do not take the ITBS either because they are 
absent on the exam day or because they are exempt from testing due to placement in certain 
                                                      
31 For eighth grade, we compare achievement in the 1996 and 1998 cohorts in order (i) to compare scores on 
comparable test forms and (ii) to avoid picking up test score gains due solely to increasing familiarity with a new 
exam.  There is a considerable literature showing that test scores increase sharply the second year an exam is given 
because teachers and students have become more familiar with the content of the exam.  See Koretz (1996).  For 
fourth grade, we do not use the 1998 cohort because of the compositional changes due to third grade retentions in 
1997.  Instead, we compare achievement gains from 1996 to 1997.    bilingual or special education programs.  Other students in bilingual or special education 
programs are required to take the ITBS but their scores are not reported, meaning that they are 
not subject to the social promotion policy and their scores do not contribute to the determination 
of their school’s probation status.  Under the probation policy, teachers have an incentive to 
dissuade low-achieving students from taking the exam and/or to place low-achieving students in 
bilingual or special education programs so that they do not need to take the ITBS.
33  Similarly, 
teachers may also have an incentive to retain students prior to the promotional gate grades in 
order to provide additional instruction for the students and thereby reduce retention rates in the 
more highly publicized gate grades.  
Figure 5 shows trends in the proportion of students who were (a) tested with scores 
reported and (b) in special education.  The sample only includes third, sixth and eighth grade 
students from 1994 to 2000 because some special education and reporting data is not available 
for the 1993 cohort.  Bilingual students are excluded from this analysis since changes in the 
bilingual policy are confounded with the introduction of high-stakes testing.  The top panel 
shows that the percent of students who were tested and included for reporting purposes has 
declined steadily since 1994, particularly in the sixth and eighth grades.  More importantly, it 
                                                                                                                                                                           
32 There is no evidence that the accountability policy has affected the probability of elementary students transferring 
to private schools, moving out of the district or dropping out of school. Figures available from the author upon 
request.  
33 Schools are not explicitly judged on the percentage of their students who take the exams, although it is likely that a 
school with an unusually high fraction of students who miss the exam would come under scrutiny by the central 
office. In a recent descriptive analysis of testing patterns in Chicago, Easton et al. (2000, 2001) found that the 
percent of ChiPS students who are tested and included for reporting purposes declined during the 1990s, although 
they attribute this decline to an increase in bilingual students in Chicago along with changes in the bilingual testing 
policy.  Prior to 1997, the ITBS scores of all bilingual students who took the standardized exams were included for 
official reporting purposes.  During this time, ChiPS testing policy required students enrolled in bilingual programs 
for more than three years to take the ITBS, but teachers were given the option to test other bilingual students.  
According to school officials, many teachers were reluctant to test bilingual students, fearing that their low scores 
would reflect poorly on the school.  Beginning in 1997, ChiPS began excluding the ITBS scores of students who had 
been enrolled in bilingual programs for three or fewer years to encourage teachers to test these students for appears that the trend became steeper beginning in 1997, suggesting that the accountability policy 
may have influenced teacher and administrator behavior.  Similarly, we see that the proportion of 
students receiving special education services increased sharply for sixth and eighth graders 
beginning in 1997 and for third graders in 1999.     
Table 11 shows the corresponding Probit estimates for special education placement (the 
cells show the marginal effects evaluated at the mean).  The sample is limited to the 1994-1998 
cohorts because estimates for the later cohorts may be confounded by earlier grade retention.
34  
Controls include demographics, prior achievement, prior testing status and prior special 
education placement as well as a pre-existing trend (estimated off of the 1994-1996 cohorts).  
Column 1 shows the estimates for the full sample.  The results suggest that the accountability has 
increased the proportion of students receiving special education services between 1 and 3 
percentage points by 1998, which translates to relative increases of 14 to 24 percent.  The next 
three columns show that these effects are concentrated in the lowest-achieving schools.   
The final three columns of Table 11 show the estimates separately by school achievement 
level, but only for those students whose prior achievement put them at risk for special education 
placement (i.e., students in the bottom quartile of the national achievement distribution).  Notice 
that the top performing schools were more aggressive in placing students in special education 
prior to the accountability policy, perhaps because these students were performed lower relative 
to school average achievement level and were thus more obvious candidates for evaluation.  Here 
                                                                                                                                                                           
diagnostic purposes.  In 1999, the ChiPS began excluding the scores of fourth year bilingual students as well, but 
also began requiring third-year bilingual students to take the ITBS exams.   
34 Students who were previously in special education were more likely to have received waivers from the 
accountability policy, and thus more likely to appear in the 1999 or 2000 cohorts.  One alternative would be to 
control for special education placement at t-3 or t-4, but data is not available this far back for the earlier cohorts.   we see that the highest risk students, conditional on their prior achievement level,
35 were more 
likely to be placed in special education under the accountability regime if they were attending 
low-achieving schools.  For example, the lowest performing schools increased special education 
placements for high-risk sixth graders by 50 percent following the introduction of the 
accountability policy, compared with an increase of roughly 32 percent among moderate-
achieving schools and no increase among the highest performing schools.  This is consistent with 
the incentives provided by the policy.   
 
7.3   Grade retention 
Another way for teachers to shield low-achieving students from the accountability 
mandates is to preemptively retain them—that is, hold them back before they enter grade three, 
six or eight.  By doing so, teachers allow these children to mature and gain an additional year of 
learning before moving to the next grade and facing the high-stakes exam.  Thus, even in grades 
not directly affected by the promotional policy retention rates may have increased under high-
stakes testing.
 36  However, because teachers (and parents) are extremely reluctant to retain 
students multiple times, one would predict retention rates in grades four, five and seven to 
increase initially, but then level off or decline as the probability that students entering these 
grades have already been retained once in an earlier grade increases.
37  Figure 6 shows this exact 
pattern.  Prior to the accountability policy, the retention rate was roughly 4 to 5 percent in first 
                                                      
35 We have controlled for the students prior achievement level in each regression using third order polynomials in 
prior reading and math. 
36 Roderick et al. (2000) found that retention rates in kindergarten, first and second grades started to rise in 1996 and 
jumped sharply in 1997 among first and second graders.  Building on this earlier work, the analysis here (a) controls 
for changes in student composition and pre-existing trends, (b) explicitly examines heterogeneity across students and 
(c) examines similar trends in grades four, five and seven.   
37 Alternatively, one would predict a cumulative measure of grade retention by any point in time to increase more 
consistently, perhaps level off, but certainly not decline.       grade, 2.5 percent in second grade and a little over 1 percent in grades four, five and seven.  
Retention rates began to increase in 1996, possibly in anticipation of the new standards the 
students would face in 1997.  In most grades, the rates peaked in 1997 and then declined 
somewhat.  However, the first grade retention rate continued to increase over time.  This is 
consistent with the fact that first grade is likely the first opportunity for retention for most 
students, while teachers in other grades take prior retentions into consideration when in deciding 
whether or not to hold a student back.       
Table 12 presents Probit estimates of the effect of high-stakes testing on grade retention 
in these grades.  The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes on the value one if the 
student was enrolled in the same grade the following year, and zero otherwise.  The top panel 
replicates the trends shown in Figure 6, but also controls for student, school and neighborhood 
demographics.  In comparison to 1993-95, retention rates in 1997 increased by 33 percent in first 
grade, 100 percent in second grade and 150-200 percent in grades four, five and seven.  The 
bottom panel controls for current achievement, age and special education status as well as 
demographic variables, thereby accounting for prior retention and giving a better sense of the 
marginal effect of the policy on the propensity to retain students.  Notice that the estimates for 
1997 and 1998 do not change much, but the estimates for 1999 and 2000 increase somewhat.   
 
7.4  Sensitivity analysis 
To test the sensitivity of the findings presented in the previous sections, Table 13 presents 
comparable estimates for a variety of different specifications and samples.  For simplicity, I only 
present result for the 1998 eighth grade cohort.  (The sensitivity results are comparable for the 
other grades and cohorts.  Tables available from author upon request.)  Row 1 shows the baseline estimates.  The next three rows show that the results are not sensitive to including students who 
either were in that grade for the second time (e.g., retained students) or whose test scores were 
not included for official reporting purposes because of a special education or bilingual 
classification.  Rows 5 and 6 expand the sample even further, including students with missing 
outcome data, and instead imputing test scores using different rules.  The inclusion of these 
students does not change the results.  Rows 7 to 9 examine the robustness of the findings to the 
exclusion of prior test score data and/or pre-existing achievement trends, finding that neither of 
these alternative specifications substantially change the results.  Row 10 presents results that 
include school fixed effects and obtain similar results, indicating that the composition of schools 
in Chicago did not change appreciably over this time period.  Finally, rows 11 and 12 estimate 
the findings using only the 1994, 1996 and 1998 cohorts, all of which took Form L of the ITBS.  
This should control for any changes in form difficulty that may confound the results.  We see that 
while the results shrink somewhat, they are still statistically significant and large in magnitude.   
 
8. Conclusions 
When the federal legislation No Child Left Behind became law earlier this year, high-
stakes testing took on a heightened level of importance for students, teachers and parents across 
the country.  The results of this analysis suggest that HST substantially increases math and 
reading performance, with test score gains on the order of 0.20 to 0.30 standard deviations.  To 
put these results in perspective, it is useful to compare them to other education programs.
38  One 
of the most popular reform strategies that has been shown to improve student achievement is 
                                                      
38 This is complicated by the fact that there is little compelling evidence that many popular education reform 
strategies, such as raising teacher salaries or increasing certification requirements, have any impact on student 
achievement (Hanushek 1996).   reducing class sizes.  Results from a randomized experiment, Tennessee STAR, suggests that 
reducing class size in the early elementary grades from 22 to 15 students raises achievement by 
roughly 0.20 standard deviations (Krueger 1999, Nye et. al. 1999, Finn and Achilles 1999).   
If the benefits of HST are equal to or greater than most other education programs, the 
costs are almost certainly lower.  Based on an analysis of school accountability systems 
throughout the country, Hoxby (2001) concludes that the current state accountability programs 
cost between $5 and $35 per pupil each year.  These figures include the costs of assessment (e.g., 
writing and publishing standards, purchasing and scoring exams, publishing results, and 
designing/piloting new assessments if off-the-shelf exams are not used) as well as the cost of 
running an office of accountability (e.g., increased staff to promulgate standards, run seminars for 
teachers and principals, answer questions for parents, calculate and monitor school progress, 
assist failing schools, etc.).  California and Texas, states with relatively sophisticated and 
comprehensive accountability systems, spend only $20 per pupil per year on their programs, 
which amounts to less than 0.3 percent of total per pupil expenditures in these states.  In 
comparison, Hoxby (2001) estimates that a 10 percent reduction in class size (about 2 kids per 
classroom) would cost roughly $615 per pupil and a 10 percent increase in teacher compensation 
would cost roughly $437 per student.  In a cost-benefit analysis of STAR, Krueger (2000) 
estimates that class size reductions of the magnitude examined in this randomized experiment 
would cost $3,501 per pupil each year a student is in a small class.
39 
                                                      
39  This assumes that the cost of creating and staffing new classrooms is proportional to the annual per pupil cost, 
and is based on the 47 percent increase in classrooms implied by the class size reductions in STAR (7/15=0.467) and 
uses the 1997-98 national average per pupil expenditure figure of $7,502.  Using the national average per pupil 
expenditures in 2000-2001 of $8,157, the cost would be $3,807.  Hoxby (2001) estimates that the cost of class size 
reductions is proportional to the proportion of per pupil expenditures devoted to teacher compensation and other 
costs that are proportional to building size, which she estimates as roughly 74 percent of per pupil expenditures.  
Based on these assumptions, the cost of class size reductions similar to those in STAR would be $2,817 in 2000-While the Chicago accountability program was somewhat more extensive than others, it 
too appears to be relatively inexpensive.  The annual assessment and administrative cost of the 
accountability program in Chicago is roughly $13 per pupil.
40  Unlike most state systems, the 
Chicago program included a number of support programs for students and schools.  In 2000-
2001, Chicago spent $43.7 million on the summer school program and $12 million on the 
Lighthouse afterschool program.  These services for low-achieving students amounted to roughly 
$144 per pupil.
41  The increases in special education placement also imposed a cost.  If we make 
the conservative assumption that special education rates increased by two percentage points in all 
grades (mirroring the increases we saw in grades three, six and eight), this would translate to an 
additional expenditure of $40 per pupil.
42  Finally, the policy of ending social promotion had a 
large potential impact on the cost of the program.  During the first four years of the 
accountability policy, roughly 5 percent of all elementary students were retained each year, which 
translates to roughly 3 percent of all ChiPS students.
43  If we assume that each of these students 
will remain in school an additional year, the annual cost of ending social promotion would be 
                                                                                                                                                                           
2001.  These estimates do not take into account the potential decline in teacher quality that may result from wide-
scale reduction in class size. 
40 Based on expenditures for the Office of Accountability of $5.2 million in 2000-2001 and average daily attendance 
of 387,000 students.     
41 Because the analysis presented in this paper does not capture many of the benefits of these programs, including the 
full cost of the programs will tend to overstate the overall cost of the accountability policy.  For example, the 
Lighthouse after-school program is targeted largely at students who have been retained.  By focusing on first-time or 
non-retained students, the analysis above would not capture much of the benefit associated with the program.  
Similarly, many of the students who attended summer school are not captured in this analysis.  For example, third 
grade students who attended summer school in 1997 (and passed in August) would be in the 2000 cohort of 6
th 
graders, the last to be included in the sample.  Thus, the analysis above will not capture the benefits to 3
rd grade 
students who attended summer school in 1998, 1999 or 2000.  For a separate analysis of summer school, that 
examines the full causal impact of the program, see Jacob and Lefgren (2002a).   
42 This assumes that per pupil expenditures are roughly 1.25 times greater for special education students with mild 
learning disabilities compared with regular education students (Chambers 1998) and is based on the per pupil 
expenditures in Chicago in 2000-2001 of $8,047.   
43 This combines the 7 to 15 percent retained in grades 3, 6 and 8 with the small increases in preemptive retentions in 
other elementary grades.   roughly $250 per pupil.
44  Thus, a conservative estimate of the total cost of the accountability 
policy in Chicago is roughly $447 per pupil, still a fraction of the cost of a class size reduction 
comparable to STAR.   
While test-based accountability appears to improve student achievement at a relatively 
low cost, it also has several potential drawbacks.  Insofar as the test score gains were driven 
largely by an improvement in certain specific skills and/or student effort, it is likely that they will 
not generalize well to alternative performance measures, particularly those that tap other domains 
of knowledge.  The accountability policy also led to modest increases in special education 
placement and grade retention.  There is little current evidence on the long-term effects of these 
practices, though many educators content that they have negative consequences for students.
45   
The passage of the No Child Left Behind ensures that test-based accountability will be a 
pervasive force in elementary and secondary education for years to come.  This study provides 
some of the first credible empirical evidence such policies.  I find that the accountability policy in 
Chicago led to substantial increases in math and reading achievement, driven largely by an 
increase in certain test-specific skills and student effort.  In addition, I find that teachers respond 
strategically to the policy along a variety of other dimensions, most importantly by placing 
marginal students in special education programs where their scores are not reported for 
                                                      
44 This figure likely overstates the cost of ending social promotion for three reasons: (1) given the fact that 
graduation rates in Chicago are roughly 60%, it is likely that many of the retained students will drop out of school, in 
which case retention may not increase the total years of schooling per student; (2) these costs should be discounted 
because the school system will not incur the costs of additional schooling for many years; (3) because early grade 
retention greatly reduces the probability of later retention, annual steady state retention rate for elementary students 
will likely be lower than 5 percent.   
45 Unfortunately, there is little good evidence on the long-term causal impact of either intervention.  Hanushek et. 
al. (1998) find that special education has a modest positive impact on achievement.  Jacob and Lefgren (2002a)  find 
that grade retention has a mixed effect on achievement.  Other studies suggest that grade retention increases the 
likelihood of dropping out, although this research is plagued by selection bias.        
 accountability purposes.  Overall, these results suggest that high-stakes testing has the potential 
to substantially improve student learning, but needs to be approached with caution. 
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Student Outcomes    
Tested
a  0.958 0.962 
Tested and Scores Reported
a  0.866 0.839 
In Special Education  0.116 0.139 
ITBS Math Score (GE’s relative to national norm)
b  -0.76 -0.25 
ITBS Reading Score (GE’s relative to national norm)
b  -0.96 -0.58 
Accountability Policy
c    
Percent who failed to meet promotional criteria in May  --  0.393 
Percent retained or in transition center next year  --  0.078 
Percent attending school on academic probation  --  0.108 
Student Demographics    
Prior math achievement (GE’s relative to national norm)
d  -0.58   -0.42 
Prior reading achievement (GE’s relative to national norm)
d  -0.89 -0.71 
Male  0.505 0.507 
Black  0.544 0.536 
Hispanic  0.305 0.326 
Age
b  11.839 11.719 
Living in foster care  0.032 0.051 
Free or reduced price lunch  0.795 0.861 
In bilingual program (currently or in the past)  0.331 0.359 
Select Neighborhood Characteristics
e    
Median HH Income  22,700 23,276 
% Managers/Professionals (of those working)  0.169 0.169 
Poverty Rate  0.269 0.254 
% not working  0.407 0.402 
Female Headed HH  0.406 0.391 
Number of observations  370,210  397,057 
Notes: The sample includes students in grades 3, 6 and 8 from 1993 to 2000 who were not missing demographic 
information.  
a Excludes bilingual students. 
b Excludes retainees (i.e., students attending the grade for the second or 
third time).  
c Includes students in 1997 to 2000 cohorts, although the promotional criteria changed somewhat over 
this period.  
d Excludes students in grade three since sufficient prior achievement measures were not available.  
eBased on the census tract in which the student was living, with data taken from the 1990 census.  
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  Table 2: OLS Estimates of ITBS Math and Reading Achievement  
  Dependent Variable: Standardized ITBS Score 
3
rd Grade  Reading Math 

















th Grade    

















th Grade    
















Includes controls for demographics, 
prior achievement and pre-existing 
trends 
Yes Yes 
Notes:  Includes students in the specified grades from 1993 to 2000.  Control variables not shown include race, 
gender, race*gender interactions, guardian, bilingual status, special education placement, prior math and reading 
achievement, school demographics (including enrollment, racial composition, percent free lunch, percent with 
limited English proficiency and mobility rate) and demographic characteristics of the student’s home census tract 
(including median household income, crime rate, percent of residents who own their own homes, percent of female-
headed household, mean education level, unemployment rate, percent below poverty, percent managers or 
professionals and percent who are living in the same house for five years).  Prior achievement is measured by math 
and reading scores three years prior to the base year (i.e., at t-3).  Missing test scores are imputed using other 
observable characteristics of the student and a variable is included indicating the score was missing.  Second and 
third-order polynomials in prior achievement are included to account for any non-linear relationship between past 
and current test scores.  Robust standard errors that account for the correlation of errors within schools are shown in 
parentheses.       
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Table 3: OLS Estimates of Achievement Trends in Chicago versus Other Large 
Midwestern Cities  
  Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables  Math Score  Reading Score 


























Fixed effects for 
each district and 
grade 





No Yes No Yes 
Number of 
observations  131 131 131 131 
Notes:  Observations are district-level averages by grade, subject and year.  Scores are standardized using the mean 
and standard deviation for the earliest available year for that grade and subject.  The comparison cities include 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Differential Effects of Student versus School Incentives   
 
Gate Grades  
(Student accountability in  
math and reading +  
school accountability in reading) 
Other Grades  
(School accountability in reading) 
 Average  3
rd Grade  6
th Grade 8
th Grade Average   4
th Grade  5
th Grade 7
th Grade 
1997  Cohort          
































1998  Cohort          
































Notes: The sample includes first-time students who were tested and whose scores were included in reporting.  The 
1997 estimates come from a model in which prior achievement is measured at t-3, as in the baseline results.  The 
1998 estimates come from a model in which prior achievement is measured at t-1, t-2 and t-3 in an attempt to 
account for compositional changes resulting from grade retention in 1997.  Robust standard errors that account for 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: The Relationship between Item Type, Position and Improvement on the ITBS 
Math Exam 
  Dependent Variable =  
Proportion of Students Answering the Item Correctly 
on the ITBS Math Exam 
Independent Variables  (1)   (2)  (3) 






Basic Skills * 1998  0.022 
(0.005)    
Math Computation *1998    0.025 
(0.008)   
Whole numbers   
    
Decimals      
0.000 
(0.010) 
Fractions      
0.022 
(0.017) 
Number Concepts *1998     0.023 
(0.008)   
Equations and inequalities     
0.002 
(0.015) 
Fractions, decimals, percents     
0.004 
(0.013) 
Geometry    
0.002 
(0.013) 
Measurement    
-0.028 
(0.016) 
Numeration and operations     
0.001 
(0.011) 
Probability and statistics     
0.011 
(0.018) 
Other Skills * 1998   
    
Estimation *1998    0.003 
(0.012)   
Compensation    
-0.043 
(0.012) 
Order of magnitude     
-0.013 
(0.015) 
Standard rounding     
-0.002 
(0.011)  57
Data Analysis *1998    0.006 
(0.013)   
Compare quantiles     
-0.018 
(0.015) 
Interpret relationships   
  -0.024 
(0.012) 
Read amounts   
  -0.002 
(0.016) 
Problem Solving * 1998   
 
   
Multiple step   
  -0.023 
(0.012) 
Use strategies    
  -0.032 
(0.014) 
Single step    
  -0.017 
(0.013) 
2



























Number of Observations  1,038  1,038  1,038 
R-Squared .960  .962  .962 
Notes: The sample consists of all tested and included students in grades three, six and eight in years 1994, 1996 and 
1998.  The units of observation are item*year proportions, reflecting the proportion of students answering the item 
correctly in that year.  Fixed effects for grade, main effects for item difficulty, item difficulty x 1998 and item 
position are included in the models but not shown here.  58
Table 9: The Relationship between Item Type, Position and Improvement on the ITBS 
Reading Exam  
  Dependent Variable =  
Proportion of Students Answering the Item Correctly on 
the ITBS Reading Exam 
  (1) (2) (3) 






Construct Factual Meaning * 1998   0.000 
(0.009)   
Literal meaning of words     -0.009 
(0.020) 
Understand factual information     -0.004 
(0.014) 
Construct Inferential Meaning * 
1998 
 -0.001 
(0.009)   
Draw conclusions     -0.009 
(0.014) 
Infer feelings, traits, motives of 
characters 
   0.001 
(0.016) 
Represent/apply information     -0.003 
(0.019) 
Construct Evaluative Meaning * 
1998 
   
 
Author’s attitude, purpose, 
viewpoint 
   -0.001 
(0.018) 
Determine main idea     
 
Interpret non-literal language     -0.008 
(0.020) 
Structure, mood, style, tone     -0.014 
(0.019) 
2






























Number of Observations  387  387  387 
R-Squared 0.958  0.959  .963 
Notes: The sample consists of all tested and included students in grades three, six and eight in years 1994, 1996 and 
1998.  The units of observation are item*year proportions, reflecting the proportion of students answering the item  59
correctly in that year.  Fixed effects for grade, main effects for item difficulty and item type are included in the 
models but not shown here.  Fixed effects for grade, main effects for item difficulty, item difficulty x 1998 and item 
position are included in the models but not shown here.  60
Table 10: Differential Effects on Low versus High Stakes Subjects  
  Dependent Variables: ITBS score in … 
Independent Variables  Math  Reading  Science  Social Studies 
Model 1      








Model 2      









































HS * (School had < 20% 











HS* (School had 20-40% 











Notes:  Cells contain OLS estimates based on comparisons of the 1996 and 1998 cohorts for grade eight and the 
1996 and 1997 cohorts for grade four, controlling for the student, school and neighborhood demographics described 
in the notes to Table 2.  ITBS scores are standardized separately by grade and subject, using the 1996 student-level 
mean and standard deviation.  Estimates in the top row are based a model with no interactions.  The estimates in the 
subsequent rows are based on a single regression model that includes interactions between high-stakes testing and 
student or school prior achievement, with high ability students in high-achieving schools as the omitted category.  















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12: Has High-Stakes Testing Increased Grade Retention in Grades not Directly 
Affected by the Social Promotion Policy?   
  Dependent Variables =  
Retained in the same grade the following year 
Sample & Specification  1
st Grade  2
nd Grade  4
th Grade  5
th Grade  7
th Grade 
Controlling for student, 
school and neighborhood 
demographics 
     








































Controlling for current 
achievement, age and 
special education status as 
well as the demographics 
from above 
     









































(average for 1993-95)  0.046 0.025 0.014 0.012 0.012 
Number of observations  273,387  259,240  234,488  227,095  211,905 
Notes: All of the estimates above come from Probit models and the marginal effects are shown in the cells.  Robust 
standard errors that account for the correlation of errors within school are presented in parentheses.  Demographics 
include gender, race, free lunch, bilingual status, and neighborhood and school characteristics.  Current achievement 
is specified as a second order polynomial in reading and math and current age is specified as a series of dummy 
variables.  The models for first and second graders do not contain any achievement measures since standardized tests 
are not mandatory until third grade. 
  63
Table 13: Sensitivity Analysis 
  Dependent Variable 
Specification 








Including students who were tested, but whose 
scores were not counted for official reporting 





Including students who were in the grade for the 









Including both non-reported and retained students, 
and imputing scores for students who did not take 
the ITBS (impute to the 25






Including both non-reported and retained students, 
and imputing scores for students who did not take 
the ITBS (impute to the 10
























Common Form I – only include the 1994, 1996 and 





Common Form II – only include the 1994, 1996 and 





Notes: For the sake of brevity, the estimates shown in the cells above are the effects of high-stakes testing on the 
1998 eighth grade cohort.  Results are comparable for other grades and cohorts, and are available upon request from 
the author.    64
Figure 1: Unadjusted ITBS Achievement Trends in Chicago, 1990-2000 
 
 
Notes: The sample includes 3
rd, 6
th and 8
th grade students from 1990 to 2000, excluding retainees and students whose 
scores were not reported. The scores are standardized separately for each grade using the 1990 student-level mean 
and standard deviation.       






































Figure 2: Observed versus Predicted Achievement Levels in Chicago, 1993-2000 
   
 
Notes: The sample includes 3
rd, 6
th and 8
th grade students from 1993 to 2000, excluding retainees and students whose 
scores were not reported.  Scores are standardized separately for each grade using the 1993 student-level mean and 
standard deviation.  The predicted scores are derived from an OLS regression on pre-policy cohorts (1993 to 1996) 
that includes controls for student, school and neighborhood demographics as well as prior student achievement and a 








































































Observed Reading Predicted Reading 66
Figure 3: Achievement Trends in Chicago versus Other Large, Urban School Districts in 






Notes:  The achievement series for large Midwestern cities includes data for all tested elementary grades in 
Cincinnati, Gary, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Milwaukee.  The sample includes all grades from 3 to 8 for which test 
score data was available, and only includes students whose tests scores were reported. Test scores are standardized 




















































































Large Midwestern Cities Chicago 67




Notes: Chicago averages exclude retained students.  District averages are standardized separately using the 1993 
state mean and across school standard deviation in the state.  The value shown above is the difference in the 
standardized score for each year.  A complete list of the comparison districts can be found in the text.     
 
Trends in IGAP Math Achievement Across Illinois:  








































































3rd Grade 6th Grade 8th Grade
Trends in IGAP Reading Achievement Across Illinois:  








































































3rd Grade 6th Grade 8th Grade 68





Notes: The sample includes only first-time, non-bilingual students.     



































































3rd Grade 6th Grade 8th Grade




































































3rd Grade 6th Grade 8th Grade 69




Notes: The sample includes only first-time, non-bilingual students.     

























4th Grade 5th Grade 7th Grade 1st Grade 2nd Grade